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CASE COMMENTS
kerosene for several years, and no one had ever complained about
it. Y bought some of the oil which had been adulterated by gaso-
line and she was severly injured when it exploded. In an excel-
lantly written opinion, the Virginia court considered numerous
authorities on the subject and reached the conclusion that where
the vendor is not the manufacturer and the purchaser knows or
should know this, then the vendor is not responsible for latent
defects on the theory of implied warranty. Accord, Universal
Motors Co. v. Snow, 149 Va. 690, 140 S. E. 653 (1927).
The above decisions have a firm foundation. Any other re-
sults would have been inequitable and undesirable, defeating the
very reason for the existence of implied warranties. As was so ably
pointed out in Ellis v. Montgomery & Crawford, Inc., 189 S.C. 72,
200 S.E. 82 (1938), a rule contra to the one in the principal case
would make retailers of the simplest and most common household
and other goods absolute insurers of the infallibility of all those
in the manufacturing process, from the raw-material suppliers to
middlemen handling the finished product which he re-sells to the
ultimate consumer.
L. O. H.
TORTS-WONGFUL DEATH-SuiciDE ACIONABLE WVHEE IN-
DUCED BY DEFzmNA.-A diamond broker having committed suicide,
his personal representative brought an action against two diamond
dealers to recover under N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 130. Ds had
allegedly obtained a diamond from deceased upon the agreement
that they would return the stone or give compensation therefor upon
demand. Decedent had received the diamond from a wholesaler
on the same terms. When decedent called for the diamond, Ds
refused to return it or to pay for it, thereby intentionally threaten-
ing the broker's reputation and livelihood. P alleged that Ds' wilful
act induced in the broker an irresistible impulse to take his own
life. Held, denying motion to dismiss the cause of action, that where
it was alleged that malicious and intentional conversion of a con-
signed diamond induced in the deceased an irresistible impulse to
take his own life, and that he did so, recovery could be had for the
death of deceased caused by Ds' wrongful act. Cauverien v. De
Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1959).
The principal case represents the latest stage in the evolution
of a rule of law that has been three quarters of a century in the
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making. It has long been held that suicide is a new and independent
agency, which breaks the casual connection between the wrongful
act and the death, precluding an action under the wrongful death
statutes. Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881).
The rule against recovery for a suicide was made even more
emphatic in Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921), which
held that if a man kills himself deliberately, there is an intervening
act of his own will for which there is no recovery. If, on the other
hand, his self-killing is not of his own volition, but the result of
suicidal mania, it must be held that suicidal mania is not a natural
or reasonable result of either mental or physical torture, and even
under these circumstances the act of suicide affords no remedy.
In the meantime, during this early period, while expressed
judicial opinion against recovery for suicide was seemingly ada-
manthie, the seeds of a new rule were being planted. In the often-
cited case of Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 183 Mass. 393,
67 N. E. 424 (1903), while denying recovery in the specific instance
on the ground that the voluntary, wilful act of suicide of an insane
person, who knows the purpose and physical effect of his act, is a
new and independent cause, the court observed by way of dictum:
"The liability of a defendant for a death by suicide exists
only when the death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse,
or is accomplished in delirium or frenzy caused by the collision
and without conscious volition to produce death, having knowl-
edge of the physical nature and consequences of the act."
Citing that decision and following its dictum was the case of
In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915), which heralded
a long and consistent line of workmen's compensation cases. The
deceased in this instance received an injury through a splash of
molten lead in his eye in the course of his employment by D. The
court, in granting recovery, sustained the finding of the Industrial
Accident Board that decedent threw himself from a window and
was fatally injured while insane, that the insanity resulted from
the injury and that the death resulted from an uncontrollable im-
pulse and without conscious volition to produce death.
The workmen's compensation cases were particularly receptive
to such a rule, for in this field, the laws are given a broad and liberal
construction, and, although the rule of proximate cause is applied,
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doubtful cases are resolved in favor of compensation. Morris v.
State Compensation Commissioner, 135 W. Va. 425, 64 S.E.2d 496
(1951).
Since the Sponatski decision, supra, a growing number of cases
under the workmen's compensation acts has consistently granted
recovery where the facts indicate an uncontrollable impulse on the
part of decedent to take his own life due to an injury sustained
while in the employ of the defendant. Prentiss Truck & Tractor
Co. v Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So.2d 272 (1956); Maricle v. Glazier,
307 N.Y. 738, 121 N.E.2d 549 (1954). Some decisions have been
based upon the extrahazardous nature of decedent's employment
prior to his injury. McFarland v. Department of Labor & Indus.,
188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714 (1936).
More conservative jurisdictions have recognized the rule by
way of dicta, but have consistently denied recovery on the ground
that in each case P failed to establish the existence of an uncon-
trollable impulse in the decedent's prior to his death. Kasman v.
Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762 (1942);
Cubit v. City of Philadelphia, 138 Pa. Super. 569, 10 A.2d 853
(1940).
The federal courts seem to distinguish the employer-employee
relationship between the defendant and the decedent, for although
general tort liability has been denied where insanity induced by
D drove decedent to suicide, Scheffer v. Railroad Co., supra; Sal-
sedo v. Palmer, supra, recovery has been granted where it was
sought under the appropriate worker's compensation act. In the
case of Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1951), the court held that in cases in-
volving suicide, under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Law, a distinction should be drawn between a wilful
intention to kill one's self and an act of self-destruction which,
because of employee's mental condition due to insanity, is not wilful.
In the broader branches of tort law, however, the courts hesi-
tate to adopt this exception to the rule of no liability for a suicide.
The great weight of authority seems to be exemplified in the decision
of Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324
(1948). In that case it was observed that so many elements may
enter into a suicide that it is impossible to say that it was the natural
and probable consequence of the negligence. Thus the doctrine set
forth earlier in Scheffer v. Railroad Co., supra, is still the dominating
rule.
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However, there are forebodings of the day when the irresistible
impulse doctrine of liability for suicide may break its workmen's
compensation confines and be cast upon the public. Already, in
Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 176 S.E. 112 (1934),
it has been held that where D's automobile negligently struck P's
decedent, causing head injuries that resulted in insanity, and that
while in this insane condition decedent took his own life, a cause
of action was stated.
On the other hand, where D's accusations of larceny were
"more than decedent could endure" and he thereby took his own life,
decedent's intervening act was held to be the sole proximate cause
of his death. Jones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176, 191 S.W.2d 439
(1946). In the only other case found in which recovery was sought
for a suicide where the insanity of decedent was not caused by a
physical injury, but by malicious threats and demands by Ds, the
court held that no remedy was available. Stevens v. Steadman, 140
Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1913). However, the plaintiff in each of these
instances presented a case that was too weak to inspire precedent.
This deficiency in the factual situation seems to have been fulfilled
by the principal case, which has made a bold step in the direction
of the irresistible impulse doctrine of recovery for suicide.
To provide an indication of the possibilities the rule in the
principal case might present, a recent English case was found in
which decedent sustained head injuries in the course of employment
by D. Eighteen months later, as a result of a condition of "acute
anxiety neurosis" induced by the injury, decedent "deliberately
hanged himself." The court's reasoning was that "on the evidence
... the deceased would not have committed suicide if he had not
been in a condition of acute neurotic depression induced by the
accident." Pigney v. Pointer's Transport Services Ltd., [1957] 1
Weekly L.R. 1121 (S.A.).
Courts have expressed alarm at the possible implications of the
rule, were it widely accepted. See Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159
Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436, 444 (1930). In speculating as to the
logical ultimation of such a rule, must it not be considered that
where one is liable for inducing the suicide of another by a wholly
unrelated act, such as negligence which results in an injury, a mali-
cious, or perhaps thoughtless, accusation or demand, or, as in the
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principal case, the wrongful conversion of goods, one might also
be responsible criminally for the same act, having aided and abetted
a suicide?
If decedent, in his irresponsible condition, takes another's life
as well as his own, or perhaps instead of his own, would not the
defendant be liable under the wrongful death statutes for any such
result? Or, instead of death, if mere property damage to the injured
person or to a third person resulted from the uncontrollable impulses
caused by defendant's act, would not defendant be responsible for
all these consequences? Viewing the situation in a different aspect,
how much litigation would be encouraged were the courts to con-
done the establishing of causation by mere speculative testimony
in mental illness circumstances?
Upon considering these questions, and countless others that
might arise, it is plainly evident that this rule is not one adapted
for universal application, but is merely a mutated offspring of the
general rule, that was formulated as a desperate short-cut to justice
in a few isolated "hardship" cases. It is conceivable that an
extremely restricted version of the rule might render justice in those
exceptional cases, but in view of the tendency of the courts toward
liberality over the years, such a rule, even with compromising restric-
tions, would inevitably grow cumbersome, and ultimately become
embarassing.
However, with the notable exception of the workmen's com-
pensation cases, the vast majority of jurisdictions are unwilling to
allow recovery where defendant's wrongful act is alleged to have
been the cause of decedents suicide. Although no West Virginia
cases have been found that face the situation squarely, there is
sufficient indication that this state adheres to the majority rule, even
to the inclusion of the workmen's compensation cases. Vento v.
State Compensation Commissioner, 180 W. Va. 577, 44 S.E.2d 626
(1947). This rule is so widely held and is so deeply intrenched
within the decisions of most jurisdictions that no establishment of
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